Ciencias
Administrativas. Teoría y Praxis
Num. 1 Año 13,
Enero-Junio 2017, pp. 105-115
El impacto
del gobierno corporativo en la filantropía corporativa en América Latina
The impact of corporate governance on corporate philanthropy in
Latin America
Bryan W.
Husted *, Milton Sousa **
Resumen
La relación entre el gobierno
corporativo y la filantropía
corporativa en el contexto de América Latina no se entiende bien. Se utiliza un
análisis de regresión con un panel de datos
de cuatro años para investigar los efectos de los consejeros independientes, mujeres
en el consejo, tamaño del consejo
y la libertad filantrópica en la
filantropía corporativa. Los resultados indican que los consejeros
independientes y mujeres en el consejo reducen la filantropía, mientras el
tamaño del consejo tiene un impacto positivo. El efecto de la libertad filantrópica del país también
es positivo, pero menos robusto. Estos
resultados cambian nuestro entendimiento anterior
de la relación entre la mujer consejera y la filantropía, y demuestran
como los estudios en diferentes
contextos contribuyen al desarrollo de teoría.
Palabras clave: Consejeros independientes, mujeres en el consejo, tamaño del consejo,
libertad filantrópica, filantropía.
Abstract
The relationship between corporate gover-
nance and corporate philanthropy in the Latin American context is poorly
understood. Using regression analysis with a four-year panel,
we investigate the effects of independent directors, women on the board,
board size,
and philanthropic freedom on corporate
philanthropy. The results indicate that independent directors and women on the
board affect philanthropy negatively, but
that board size has a positive effect. The
effect of philanthropic freedom
is also positive,
but less robust. These results change prior understanding about the
relationship between women on the board and philanthropy, and show how studies
in different contexts can contribute to theory
development.
Key words: Independent
directors, Women on the board, Board size, Philanthropic
freedom, Philanthropy.
Clasificación
JEL: G34, M14
Introduction
Despite increasing interest
regarding the role of corporate
community investment, or corporate philanthropy, in the development of firm-specific
competitive advantage (Porter & Kramer, 2002), the failure to take into
account the role of corporate governance as it is applied in different
institutional contexts has constrained the ability
of scholars to understand
its scope and limits. In this paper we argue that philanthropic freedom, which
refers to the extent to which a given institutional context facilitates or
inhibits charitable contributions, positively affects corporate philanthropy in
Latin America.
* Doctor en Ciencias Administrativas, Profesor de planta
y líder del grupo de investigación en innovación social,
Departamento
de Administración, Emprendimiento y Mercadotecnia,
EGADE Business School, E-mail: bhusted@itesm.mx
** Doctor en Ciencias
Administrativas , Profesor
investigador y coordinadora de la maestría
en administración de empresas,
Universidade de Fortaleza. E-mail: miltonsousa@gmail.com
Artículo recibido: 13 de septiembre de 2016 Artículo aceptado: 7 de diciembre de 2016
Prior research has examined the
impact of corporate philanthropy on firm
financial performance (Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008) in terms of diverse
contexts, including developed countries (Lee, Park, Moon, Yang, & Kim, 2009)attitude towards the
corporations conducting CP, and
subsequent purchasing intention. The model is tested in South Korea where the
culture and business environment are different from that in North America. Data
are collected from two different stakeholder groups of South Koreans (127
managers and 229 consumers: total sample of 356, emerging- market countries (Sánchez,
2000), and industry context (Brammer & Millington, 2004). Nevertheless, the
Latin American context has received little attention from
researchers regarding the relationship between corporate governance and
corporate philanthropy. Given the extent of family control of firms and the
influence of government in the region, Latin American firms likely behave
in ways that differ
from their developed-country counterparts. Therefore, we address the following
question: How does corporate governance influence corporate philanthropy in
Latin America?
Furthermore, Latin America
provides a distinctive institutional context for corporate philanthropy given
that specific laws encourage
or discourage corporate philanthropy in each country. So we address the
following question: How does the
institutional context influence corporate philanthropy in Latin America?
In order to answer these
questions, we use governance variables that are commonly studied in
developed-country contexts, such as the participation of independent directors
on the board, women on the board, and board size. Furthermore, we also include
a measure of philanthropic freedom to understand the effect of institutional
context on corporate philanthropy within Latin America. Data was analyzed with
a generalized least squares regression model. The paper is structured as
follows. In the next section,
we develop the
theory and hypotheses for the Latin American context.
Then we explain the method. Finally, we present results, followed by the
discussion and conclusion.
Theory and Hypotheses
We begin by examining the relationship of three
standard corporate governance variables to corporate philanthropy (independent
directors, women directors, and board size). These base hypotheses build from
the extant literature, which we then place in the context of Latin America. We
then introduce a key feature of institutional
context – philanthropic freedom
– to understand the impact of the institutional
context on corporate philanthropy.
Independent
Directors
Using agency theory, the literature argues that inside
directors (corporate executives) will make decisions in an attempt
to maximize their own benefit (Fama & Jensen,
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This logic has been extended to the decision about corporate
philanthropy. Frequently, executives will approve corporate philanthropy based
on their own interests, rather than the interests of stockholders. On the other hand, outside
directors (nonexecutive
directors) will better represent the
interests of stockholders and provide a check on the agency problem
faced by inside directors. Based on agency theory, one would expect to find a negative relationship between the
number of outside directors on the board and corporate philanthropy (Wang &
Coffey, 1992). Some research
supports this view, finding that inside directors are negatively related to the
decision to engage in charitable giving (Brown,
Helland, & Smith, 2006), but not to the amount of giving.
In contrast, there is a value
enhancement argument that says that inside directors (managers) use corporate
charitable contributions to create value of stockholders (Brown et al., 2006;
Harjoto & Jo, 2011); thus
independent directors will support such
value-enhancing philanthropy as beneficial for stockholders. However, in
Latin America, we expect that the agency argument will predominate given the
general lack of controls on corporate
managers, such as weak institutional investors and weak minority shareholder
rights (Nicholls-Nixon, Castilla, Garcia, & Pesquera, 2011). Thus, independent directors in
Latin America will generally tend to
act as a brake on inside directors and reduce the amount of corporate philanthropy.
H1: The percentage of independent directors on the board
has a negative effect on corporate philanthropy.
Women on
the board
Prior research finds that the presence of
women on the board is positively associated with corporate philanthropy in the
United States (Marquis & Lee, 2013; Wang & Coffey, 1992; Williams, 2003) and corporate social
responsibility (CSR) ratings, such
as those by KLD Research &
Analytics, Inc. (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010).
Wang and Coffey (1992), using a 78
Fortune 500 firms, find a positive relationship between women directors, and
corporate philanthropy. In the same line,
Williams (2003), using a
sample of 185 Fortune 500 firms over four years, find support for the idea that
firms with a higher proportion of women on the board, engage more in corporate
philanthropy than firms with a lower proportion of women on their boards.
Similar evidence is provided by Marquis and Lee (2013), who using a 10- year
panel of Fortune 500 firms, found that companies with more women on the board
donate more money for philanthropy.
The central argument behind these
research findings is that women may be more sensitive to a firm`s social
activities than male directors (Harrigan, 1981; Williams, 2003), and
often have goals that may put less emphasis on firm performance than male
directors (Wang & Coffey, 1992).
Furthermore, the proportion of
women on the board is influenced by several factors, including culture and
legislation, among others (Byron &
Post, 2016; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009; Terjesen & Singh, 2008). In Norway,
for example, the government requires that corporate boards for
public firms have a minimum of 40 per cent women
(Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh,
2009). Using data from 43 countries, Terjesen
and Singh (2008) find that women’s representation on corporate boards
may be shaped by the larger environment, including the social, political and
economic structures of each country. Although their study was broad in scope,
they did not provide specific findings
for some regions, including Latin America. A
meta-analysis finds that a
positive relationship between
the representation of women on boards and firm social performance
depends on national context, specifically stronger shareholder protections and
higher gender parity (Byron & Post, 2016).
In terms of Latin America, there
is little evidence in the general management literature about women’s representation on corporate boards.
Similarly, despite the research on the relationship between women on the board
and philanthropy in the extant literature, there is little, if any, evidence regarding the situation in Latin America. Based on prior studies in the
U.S. context, we suggest that Latin America companies
will present similar effects, since in the Latin American culture, women are
highly associated with social issues and community concern. Thus, we
hypothesize:
H2: The percentage of women on the board has a positive effect
on corporate philanthropy.
Board Size
Prior research affirms that larger boards tend to be less
effective at decision making and monitoring (Jensen, 1993; Walls & Hoffman,
2013). Jensen (1993) argues that as board
size increases, they become less effective
– more
symbolic and polite.
In accordance with Jensen
(1993), Brown et al. (2006) argue that larger boards tend to become symbolic
and a source of social interaction for the directors, and add that, larger
boards tend to set more objectives beyond profit maximization. As a result,
boards become less effective in monitoring managerial discretion and controlling corporate philanthropy that benefits
managerial interests, rather than stockholder interests (Brown, et al., 2006).
Additional empirical evidence in
the U.S. shows that larger
boards make more charitable
contributions (Brown et al., 2006; Marquis & Lee, 2013). Using a ten-year
panel of Fortune 500 companies, Marquis and Lee (2013) find that companies with
larger boards make more philanthropic donations. Along similar lines, Brown et
al. (2006), also using Fortune 500 data, find that larger boards are associated
with significantly more philanthropy.
In Latin America, there is little,
if any, evidence about the effects of
board size on corporate philanthropy. There is no reason to expect a priori why
this relationship should differ from the relationship in the United
States. Consequently, we expect that larger boards will be less
effective in protecting shareholder interests in Latin America. Thus, in Latin
America, companies with larger boards should also engage in larger amounts of
corporate philanthropy.
H3: Board size has a positive effect on corporate philanthropy.
Institutional
Context
Context matters in
corporate philanthropy and
corporate governance studies, and the institutional context can be more or less
propitious for making donations. Philanthropic freedom refers to “how easy it
is to give within a country or across borders” (Hudson
Institute, 2015:2). This ease has to do
with the incentives for engaging in philanthropy, such as tax deductions, and obstacles, such
as time involved in constituting civil society
organization. We expect that philanthropic freedom augments the impact of
independent directors, women directors, and board size on corporate
philanthropy for two reasons. First, for a given level of corporate governance
attributes, the firm should engage in more corporate philanthropy because there
are fewer obstacles to do so. Second, philanthropic freedom speaks
to the legitimacy of philanthropy in
a given nation. Where philanthropy is
more legitimate, all stakeholders, including stockholders will support
philanthropy more than in countries where philanthropy is less legitimate.
Thus, we hypothesize:
H4: Philanthropic freedom has a positive effect on corporate
philanthropy.
Methodology
The dependent, independent, and control variables were
collected from the Bloomberg database. Although Bloomberg covers 1,806 Latin American
publicly-traded companies, only 306 have Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) data. Due to missing
values among these firms, we were left with a sample of 151 companies with ESG data for four years
(2012-2015), totaling 604 observations.
Our dependent variable was the
intensity of corporate philanthropy. For the independent variables we used the
(a) independent directors,
(b) women on the board,
(c) board size,
and
(d)
country-based
philanthropic freedom. We describe the dependent, independent, and control
variables as follows:
Corporate
Philanthropy. The dependent
variable was measured by the ratio of corporate community spending to the
number of employees. Community spending was calculated by the amount of money
(in millions of US dollars) spent by the firm on community- building activities. Data were collected from the Bloomberg
ESG database.
Independent
Directors. Independent
directors were measured by the percentage of independent directors on the company’s board, as reported by the company.
Independence was defined according
to the company’s own criteria. Data were collected
from the Bloomberg ESG database.
Women
on the Board. Women on the
board was measured as the percentage of women on the firm’s board of directors
at the end of the fiscal year, if available; otherwise it was the number of
women as of the date of the latest filing. Where the company had a two-tier board, this number referred
only to the supervisory board. Data were collected from the Bloomberg ESG database.
Board
Size. Board size was
measured by the number of
directors on the company’s board, as reported by the company. It includes only
full-time directors. Deputy members of the
board were not counted. Data were collected from the Bloomberg ESG database.
Philanthropic
Freedom. In order to assess
the effect of institutional context, we used the Hudson Institute’s Philanthropic Freedom
Index 2015, a country-based variable that estimates the ease of making
donations in 64 different countries. In order to build the philanthropic
freedom index, the Hudson Institute (2015) gathered information on three dimensions:
(a)
the ease of
registering and operating civil society organizations; (b) tax policies
for deductions, credits, and exemptions; and (c) the ease of sending and
receiving cash and in-kind goods across borders. Philanthropy freedom scores
ranging from 1 to 5. The Hudson Institute indexes
are frequently used in
academic research that
addresses philanthropy in an
international context (Adelman, 2009, 2012; Srivastava & Oh, 2010).
Control
Variables. Our control
variables included leverage (logarithm of ratio, total debts to total assets)
(Brammer & Millington, 2004), size (logarithm of revenue), country
and industry sector. For country, we included a dummy
variable for Brazil. In this case, the variable was equal to one, if the firm
was located in Brazil; otherwise, it was zero. For industry sector, we followed
Brammer and Millington (2004), who included a dummy variable that represented
industries with a huge environmental and social impact. These industries were energy, industrials, materials and
utilities. So in this study, the
industry dummy variable was equal to one, if the firm was in the energy, industrials, materials or
utilities industries; otherwise, it was zero.
We used a generalized least
squares regression model in order to analyze the effect of corporate governance
and institutional context on corporate philanthropy.
Results
Descriptive Statistics.
The sample has 151 Latin
American companies based in
four countries and operating in ten industrial sectors, as shown in (Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1
Sample characteristics: Countries
Morethan half of thefirms are headquartered
in Brazil, followed by Mexico, Colombia and Chile. In terms of the industrial sectors, utilities,
materials and financials companies account for more than half of
the sample, followed by industrials, consumer staples,
consumer discretionary, among others.
We calculated the means, medians,
standard deviations, minimum and maximum values as well as the correlations
among the
variables, as shown in (Tables 3 and 4). The dependent
variable, Corporate Philanthropy has a negative and significant correlation
with
independent directors (r = -0.15,
p = 0.004) and a
negative and nearly significant correlation with women on the board (r = -0.09, p = 0.070).
Among the independent and control
variables, the largest significant correlation occurred between board size
and revenue (r = 0.26, p = 0.001). This correlation is
considered relatively low, which
decreases problems of multicollinearity. The correlation between women on the board and revenue (r
= 0.14, p = 0.004), independent directors and
philanthropic freedom (r = 0.12, p = 0.005), and independent directors and
board size (r = 0.12, p = 0.003) are significant and positive. The correlation between philanthropic freedom and leverage (r = -0.18, p = 0.001)
is significant and negative.
The rest of variables presented low and insignificant correlations, suggesting
that multicollinearity is not a problem.
Regression
Model
In
order to test
hypotheses 1 through
4, we used a generalized least squares regression model
with random effects. The
result of Hausman’s
test (χ2 =
1.82, p = 0.8728) verified that a
random-effects model was the most appropriate. Serial autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity were checked and
both problems were
present in the data.
Nevertheless, generalized least squares allows estimation in the presence
of autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity across panels.
Using Stata 13.0, we provided appropriate corrections for these problems. We
run statistical models using (a) a heteroskedastic, but uncorrelated error
structure in order to correct problems with heteroskedasticity; and (b) a panel-
specific autoregressive (AR1) autocorrelation structure, in order to correct
problems of autocorrelation.
Six regression models were
analyzed, with Corporate Philanthropy as
the dependent variable. The models testing the independent variables are displayed
in (Table 5).
Model 1 (Wald χ2 = 851.88, p = 0.001) includes only control variables. The coefficients
are positive and significant for leverage, sector and country. The coefficient for
revenue is negative and significant.
Model 2 (Wald χ2 = 671.17, p = 0.001) adds independent
directors as an independent variable. Independent directors are negatively
associated with corporate philanthropy (b =
-73.40, p = 0.001), providing support for H1.
Model 3 (Wald χ2 = 131.16, p = 0.001) considers women on the
board as an independent variable and, although statistically significant, is negatively
related to corporate philanthropy (b = -56.80, p = 0.001), which is contrary to
the sign hypothesized in H2.
Model 4 (Wald χ2 = 474.84, p = 0.001) considers board size as
an independent variable, which is positively associated with corporate
philanthropy (b = 44.32, p = 0.001), providing support for H3.
Model 5 (Wald χ2 = 833.19, p = 0.001) considers philanthropic
freedom as an independent variable, that does not have statistical
significance. This result does not support H4.
Model 6 (Wald
χ2 = 192.74, p = 0.001)
includes the three corporate governance variables as well as
philanthropic freedom, which is now significant and positively associated with
corporate philanthropy (b = 6526.00, p = 0.001) in contrast to Model 5. This
result gives partial support to H4. The coefficients and significance of the
independent variables are as follows, independent directors (b = -55.32, p =
0.001), women on the board (b = -22.10,
p = 0.074), and board size (b = 158.70, p = 0.001).
Table 5
Generalized least squares regression
model for Corporate Philanthropy
Discussion
Latin America is clearly a unique context for studying
the relationship between board structure and corporate philanthropy. As
hypothesized, independent directors do tend to reduce corporate philanthropy.
This result suggests that the argument based on agency theory applies better in
Latin America than the value-enhancement
argument. Thus, in Latin America, independent directors do act to constrain
corporate philanthropy.
Surprisingly, women
directors have a negative
effect, contrary to our initial hypothesis, which suggested that women would
favor community investment. One
possible explanation is that culture trumps gender. In
the highly masculine countries of Latin America (Hofstede & Bond, 1984), a
concern with material well-being characterizes women as well as men. Given the
poverty that characterizes the region, women directors may be more concerned
about the economic success of firms, which provide jobs, rather than community investment.
Board size, as hypothesized,
increases corporate philanthropy. This hypothesis, based on agency theory,
suggests that larger boards have more difficulty in
monitoring and controlling managerial discretion.
Consequently, larger boards tend to permit
higher levels of corporate philanthropy.
The results regarding
philanthropic freedom are mixed.
The impact of philanthropic
freedom is not significant alone, but in combination with the other variables
of the complete model is significant. These results may be due to the
relatively limited range of this variable in Latin America. Certainly, the
results of this study regarding philanthropic freedom need to be replicated in
other studies. Still, despite the
limited range, there does appear to be evidence to warrant its inclusion in
future studies.
The results for women on the board
are particularly interesting. Their presence seems to limit corporate
philanthropy more than that of men.
Some research regarding
women in Latin America suggests
that professional women actually score quite highly on measures of masculinity (Long &
Martinez, 1994). In order to arrive on the board of directors, women in Latin
America may need to exercise the masculine elements of
their personality in order to
obtain acceptance on the part of their male colleagues as well as subordinates
of both sexes. The lower levels of corporate philanthropy may suggest that such
a dynamic exists in Latin America compared to other regions of the world.
Conclusion
In summary, the picture of Latin America
is a variegated one, in which it is
impossible to portray the region
as uniform. Rather,
it appears that where the
institutional context permits greater philanthropic freedom, corporate
philanthropy increases. Furthermore, the region does not simply replicate
results found in the United
States. In the case of independent
directors, the agency-theory hypothesis clearly applies. Surprisingly, the
presence of women directors does not facilitate corporate philanthropy. Only in
the case of board size do the results
squarely accord with findings in other
regions. The principal
lesson of this
study is that Latin America is a unique region and firms
wishing to operate there will need to
understand and take into account these differences in their own
corporate-governance decisions.
Certainly this paper has important
limitations in terms of both the number of years of data and number of countries
included. The study only includes
four years of data, which
is a relatively small
panel. Also, the study includes only four countries. Countries
like Argentina and Peru do not appear. Furthermore, the many smaller economies
of Latin America are absent. Clearly these conditions are due to data limitations as a result
of the small number of
firms that are listed in stock exchanges. Over time, as the market grows, more
firms should be listed, making their data publicly available. So further
analysis could be done to extend the applicability to all of Latin America. In
addition, some of the anomalies found in Latin America, such as the negative
impact of women on the board might be studied in other emerging markets, which
may also exhibit patterns of women with highly masculine traits (Gupta, Turban,
& Wasti, 2009).
Certainly this paper opens up
several avenues of future research. First,
the role of women in Latin American firms and the
apparent need to take on highly masculine postures warrants future research.
Second, if the separation of CEO and chair roles do not control managerial discretion in Latin American
firms, are there other features of Latin American corporate governance that are being ignored that might serve as more
effective controls on managerial discretion? Although the paper is not without
flaws, it clearly points to the importance of research that examines both the
application and limits of commonly accepted ideas in the mainstream literature
– mechanisms of corporate governance may not work
effectively in other contexts and where they do work the institutional context
alters these relationships. Clearly, further work needs to be done.
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